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Abstract
New bounds on the semantic secrecy capacity of the binary adversarial wiretap channel are
established . Against an adversary which reads a ρr fraction of the transmitted codeword and
modifies a ρw fraction of the codeword, we show an achievable rate of 1−h(ρw)−ρr, where h(·)
is the binary entropy function. We also give an upper bound which is nearly matching when ρr
is small.
1 Introduction
In the most basic model of communication, a sender attempts to communicate with a receiver over
a noisy channel, with the goal of achieving reliability: the receiver should be able to recover the
intended message even in the presence of noise. The wiretap channel, introduced in [Wyn75, CK78],
adds a wiretapper or eavesdropper to the model. The wiretapper also has access to a noisy version
of the sender’s transmission, and now the sender also wants to achieve secrecy: the wiretapper
should not learn anything about the intended message. (These notions will be made precise later.)
Typically, the sender is connected to both the receiver and wiretapper by a memoryless broadcast
channel, and the dual goals of reliability and secrecy can be met with positive communication rate
when the channel to the wiretapper is “noisier” than that to the receiver.
In this work, we consider the extension of the wiretap model to the adversarial setting. We not
only allow the wiretapper to choose an arbitrary ρr fraction of transmitted symbols to read (this is
the “Wiretap Channel II” model of Ozarow and Wyner ([OW84])), but also allow the wiretapper
to choose an arbitrary ρw fraction of errors to add to the transmission before it reaches the receiver.
We refer to this model as the (ρr, ρw) adversarial wiretap channel. An incomplete survey of related
models and results appears in Section 2.2; this particular model and the name “adversarial wiretap
channel” were introduced in [WSN16] along with an explicit construction for large alphabets. The
authors of [WSN16] also show that the capacity of such a channel is at most 1− ρw − ρr.
The model of the adversarial wiretap channel represents a natural middle ground between truly
adversarial errors (i.e. ρr = 1, when the adversary has full knowledge of what is being transmitted)
and fully oblivious errors (i.e. ρr = 0, defined in [Lan08]), where the adversary has no knowledge of
which codeword is being transmitted, but can add arbitrary errors to the codeword. In that respect
it is related to the more abstract model of γ-oblivious channels due to [Lan08], where, loosely, the
parameter γ controls how much the channel knows about the transmitted codeword (see also the
discussion in Section 2.2).
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The main theorem of this work is the following, which bounds the rate of a binary code which
simultaneously achieves reliability and secrecy in the adversarial wiretap model.
Theorem (Theorem 2.7). The capacity of the (ρr, ρw) adversarial wiretap channel is at least
1− h(ρw)− ρr.
Loosely, the loss of ρr in the achievable rate is required to achieve secrecy, and can be matched
in constructions by adding some pseudorandom noise to the transmitted symbols. The loss of h(ρw)
in the rate then corresponds to what is necessary to correct a ρw fraction of errors. The challenge
faced by previous work such as [ALCP09] is that the best known rate for correcting an arbitrary ρw
error fraction is 1−h(2ρw) for binary codes. However, there are a few cases when we can achieve a
rate of 1−h(ρw) against a ρw fraction of errors, most notably in the case of random errors ([Sha48]),
and for oblivious errors ([Lan08]).
The main point of our achievability analysis, which uses random coding, is that the adversary’s
errors must behave like random or oblivious errors, even with the auxiliary knowledge of a ρr
fraction of the codeword. This allows us to show that correcting such errors only requires a h(ρw)
loss in the achievable rate, allowing for a final rate of 1−h(ρw)−ρr. This recalls the work of [DJL15]
(“Sufficiently myopic adversaries are blind”), and indeed we build on their techniques to show that
the adversary is still “blind” after reading his choice of symbols.
Our result improves on previous known bounds for binary codes, and comes close to matching
the upper bound on achievable rate induced by the random wiretap channel (Theorem 3.1) when
ρr is small.
Organization
In Section 2, we define some terminology relating to the adversarial wiretap model, including the
capacity, and build on this to discuss related work. In Section 3, we show an upper bound on the
achievable rate of any family of codes for the adversarial wiretap channel. We also give a lower
bound in Section 4 using a random code construction, which we show achieves both reliability and
secrecy. We conclude in Section 5 with some discussion of future work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Setup and notation
Notation. We will use the following conventions throughout.
Unless otherwise noted, all logs are to base 2. [n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. The function
h(·) is the binary entropy function h(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p), defined for p ∈ [0, 1]. More
generally, for a random variable X, we denote by H(X) the entropy of X.
A binary code C is a subset of {0, 1}n for some integer n, the block length. The rate of a code
C is R(C) := log|C|/n. All references to codes “of rate R” implicitly mean codes of rate at least
R; in particular, if R < 0, we will assume the code is empty.
In this work, all codes C come equipped with an arbitrary encoding function which is a bijection
between [|C|] and C mapping a message m to its encoding x. C also admits a decoding function
from {0, 1}n → [|C|], the “nearest neighbor decoder,” which maps a string y to the message m
whose encoding is closest to y in Hamming distance, with ties broken arbitrarily.
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In defining channel capacities, we will think of codes as belonging to a family of codes (denoted
C). A family of codes is a sequence (Cn ⊆ {0, 1}n)n→∞ of codes with growing block length n. We
are interested in the behavior of the codes in the family as n → ∞. For example, the rate of a
family C is
R(C) := lim inf
n→∞ R(Cn).
The focus of this work is on determining the capacity of the binary adversarial wiretap channel.
Although we believe that analogous results hold over larger alphabets, we have not checked this
formally.
Definition 2.1. Let ρr ∈ (0, 1) and let ρw ∈ (0, 1/2). The (ρr, ρw) adversarial wiretap channel
(AWTC) allows the adversary to read an arbitrary ρr fraction of the transmitted codeword and
introduce a ρw fraction of errors whose distribution depends only on the code and the symbols read
by the adversary.
Remark. This is the model proposed by [WSN16], where it is also called an AWTC, and is the
same as the “active eavesdropper” model of [ALCP09] when ρr = ρw. The adversary may use
randomness both in choosing the locations to read and in introducing errors.
In this definition, we restrict ρr, ρw to be nonzero. As we will outline in Section 2.2, the capacity
has already been established when either parameter is zero.
We now define what it means for a code to achieve secrecy and reliability over the AWTC. We
will require our codes to achieve both conditions. We will define both weak secrecy and the stronger
notion of semantic secrecy.
For a code C ⊆ {0, 1}n, we denote by S the random variable corresponding to the source message
(distributed according to some distribution PS), and by X the random variable corresponding to
C’s (possibly randomized) encoding of the message. We write Sˆ for the output of the decoder upon
receiving the corrupted version of X.
For a subset S ⊆ [n] of size ρrn corresponding to the coordinates chosen by the adversary,
denote by V(S ) the view of the adversary after observing the coordinates in S . That is, if
S = {i1, . . . , iρrn} ⊆ [n], and x ∼ X is a codeword, then V(S ) ∈ {0, 1, ?}n is the string whose ith
coordinate is ? if i /∈ S , and xi if i ∈ S . We will also refer to S as the support of V(S ).
Definition 2.2. Let C ⊆ {0, 1}n. The equivocation ∆ of the encoder is
∆(C) := min
S :|S |=ρrn
H(S|V(S )).
The quantity H(S|V(S )) measures the uncertainty remaining after the coordinates of S have
been observed, and higher ∆ corresponds to higher secrecy (the adversary learns less about the
encoded message).
Definition 2.3 (Weak secrecy). Let C be a family of codes (Cn ⊆ {0, 1}n)n→∞, and let the source
distribution PS be uniform. Let ηn be the normalized equivocation of Cn; that is,
ηn =
1
n
∆(Cn).
If ηn approaches the rate R(C) of C as n→∞, then we say that C achieves (asymptotic) weak
secrecy.
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We now define semantic secrecy (security), via the equivalent notion of mutual-information
security (see [BTV12]). This notion of secrecy arises from dropping the assumption that messages
are chosen uniformly from the message space.
Definition 2.4 (Semantic secrecy). Let C be a family of codes (Cn ⊆ {0, 1}n)n→∞. Define the
semantic secrecy metric
Sem(Cn) = max
PS,S
I(S,V(S )) = max
PS,S
D
[
PV(S )|S,Cn‖PV(S )|Cn |PS
]
,
where for two finite-support distributions P and Q, D(P‖Q) denotes the relative entropy
D(P‖Q) =
∑
x∈supp(P )
P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x)
.
If Sem(Cn) = e
−Ω(n), then we say that C achieves semantic secrecy.
Definition 2.5 (Reliability). Let C be a family of codes (Cn ⊆ {0, 1}n)n→∞. Let δn be the average
error probability of Cn; that is,
δn = Pr[Sˆ 6= S],
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the encoder and the error distribution
introduced by the adversary.
If δn → 0 as n→∞, then we say that C achieves (asymptotic) reliability.
Let C be a code family of rate at least R > 0 which achieves reliability. If C achieves weak
secrecy, we say that R is achievable under weak secrecy, and if C achieves semantic secrecy, we will
say that R is achievable under semantic secrecy.
Definition 2.6. The weak secrecy capacity of the (ρr, ρw) AWTC is the supremum of achievable
rates under weak secrecy, and the semantic secrecy capacity is the supremum of achievable rates
under semantic secrecy.
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 2.7. Let Cs(ρr, ρw) be the semantic secrecy capacity of the (ρr, ρw) AWTC. Then
max
(
1− h(ρw)− ρr, 0
) ≤ Cs(ρr, ρw) ≤ 1− h(ρw)− ρr −min
p
f(p),
where f(p) = h
(
(2ρw − 1)p+ 1− ρw
)− h(ρw)− ρrh(p).
In fact, the upper bound holds under weak secrecy.
As there is a positive gap between our upper and lower bounds, some comparisons are provided
in Figures 1 and 2. Although the bounds become far apart as ρr approaches 1 − h(ρw), because
our lower bound approaches 0 even as the capacity remains positive, when ρr is small compared to
ρw, we see that the two quantities are very close.
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Figure 1: A comparison of our upper and lower bounds for fixed values of ρw. Note that the secrecy
capacity is equal to zero when ρr > 1− 4ρw(1− ρw) (see [OU13]).
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Figure 2: The ratio between our lower and upper bounds, for fixed values of ρw. Note that our
achievable lower bound is negative when ρr > 1− h(ρw). However, the two bounds are quite close
when ρr is small compared to 1− h(ρw).
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2.2 Previous work
The (non-adversarial) wiretap channel has been the subject of a long line of work. Here we will
focus only on variants which incorporate some sort of adversarial behavior.
Limited-view Adversaries and the AWTC. The terminology “adversarial wiretap channel”
for this model was introduced in [WSN16]. The term “limited-view adversary” was also used for
the same model in earlier work by the same authors. They give an upper bound on the capacity
of the AWTP, and give an explicit construction of codes which meet this capacity over sufficiently
large alphabets.
Theorem ([WSN16]). The semantic secrecy capacity of the (ρr, ρw) adversarial wiretap channel
is at most 1− ρr − ρw.
Moreover, when the alphabet size is |Σ| = exp(Ω(1/2)), there is an explicit code of rate
1− ρr − ρw −  which achieves semantic secrecy and reliability over the (ρr, ρw) AWTC.
Remark. The construction of [WSN16] not only achieves semantic secrecy, but in fact the stronger
condition that for every message and choice of ρrn coordinates, the distribution of the adversary’s
view is exactly uniform. This requires maximum distance separable (MDS) codes, which do not
exist over binary alphabets.
Wiretapping and Active Adversaries. The authors of [ALCP09] consider the wiretap channel
II model in which the adversary may also modify the bits which have been read. They then show
that a suitable random code can be used to achieve (weak) secrecy and reliability. In fact, their
construction also works without the restriction that the adversary modifies the same bits which he
reads, so we may conclude the following.
Theorem ([ALCP09]). For any  > 0 and ρw < 1/4, there exist codes of rate
1− h(2ρw)− ρr − 
which achieve weak secrecy and reliability over the (ρr, ρw) AWTC.
As stated in the introduction, the difference between the 1 − h(2ρw) − ρr and our achievable
rate arises because the construction of [ALCP09] uses a binary code which corrects any ρw fraction
of errors, for which 1− h(2ρw) represents the best known achievable rate. The crux of our work is
to show that errors introduced by a “limited-view” adversary behave more like random errors, for
which 1− h(ρw) is the optimal rate.
The Wiretap Channel II. When the adversary may read any ρr fraction of the transmitted
codeword, but does not inject any errors (ρw = 0), this model is known as the wiretap channel II,
due to Ozarow and Wyner ([OW84]). In this setting, we have the following result (a matching code
construction is also presented).
Theorem ([OW84]). For any code of rate R which achieves weak secrecy on the (ρr, 0) adversarial
wiretap channel, we have
ρr ≤ (1−R) +Rh(δ),
where δ is the error of the decoder.
In particular, a code family of rate R which achieves weak secrecy and reliability has R ≤ 1−ρr.
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A generalization of this model is the Wiretap Channel II with a noisy main channel, studied
in [NY15]. Although they look at general classes of channels, one particular case which is relevant
for us is when the main channel is a binary symmetric channel. In this case, we have
Theorem (implicit in [NY15]). The weak secrecy capacity when the eavesdropper reads an arbi-
trary ρr fraction of the transmitted codeword and the main channel is a BSC(ρw) is at most
(1− ρr)(1− h(ρw)) = 1− h(ρw)− ρr + ρr · h(ρw).
The bounds of [NY15] are tightened in [GCP16], even under the semantic secrecy condition.
The bound attained here is the same as that of the standard wiretap channel, stated in a modified
form in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 2.8 ([GCP16]). The semantic secrecy capacity when the eavesdropper reads an arbitrary
ρr fraction of the transmitted codeword and the main channel is a BSC(ρw) is equal to
max
V−X−Y
[
I(V ;Y )− ρr · I(V ;X)
]+
,
where X and Y are the input and output, respectively, of the legitimate receiver, [x]+ = max(x, 0),
and the maximum is taken over all (V,X, Y ) such that V −X − Y forms a Markov chain and the
conditional distribution of Y given X is given by the BSC(ρw).
Oblivious adversaries. On the other hand, if ρr = 0, the adversary is “1-oblivious,” and the
capacity in this case has been established by Langberg in [Lan08].
Definition ([Lan08]). A binary channel W is γ-oblivious if W imposes at most 2(1−γ)n different
error distributions W (·|x) over all x ∈ {0, 1}n.
In other words, an oblivious channel cannot use full information about the transmitted codeword
x, and only knows enough to determine which of the 2(1−γ)n < 2n error distributions to apply.
For example, if the adversary reads an arbitrary ρrn fraction of the codeword, then the number of
possible error distributions is at most the number of such views, or at most
(
n
ρrn
)·2ρrn < 2(h(ρr)+ρr)n.
Theorem ([Lan08]). For ρw ∈ [0, 1/2) and  > 0, with high probability, a random code of rate
R = γ − h(ρw)− 
corrects a ρw fraction of errors imposed by a 1-oblivious channel with probability 1− 2−n+1 when
codewords are chosen uniformly at random.
It follows that the secrecy capacity of the (0, ρw) AWTC is 1− h(ρw).
The definition of a γ-oblivious channel is more general than that of the AWTC, as the dis-
tributions of the channel W can depend on any aspect of the codeword x, rather than just some
fixed number of symbols. An adversary who reads only a ρr fraction of symbols is (1− ρr−h(ρr))-
oblivious; however, our result shows that we can obtain tighter rate bounds under our more stringent
analogue of obliviousness.
Myopic Adversaries. The work of [DJL15] is closest in spirit to the current work. In their model,
rather than reading a ρr fraction of codeword symbols, the adversary receives the output of a BSC
on the transmitted codeword.
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Theorem ([DJL15], informal). When ρr > ρw, a random code of rate 1− h(ρw)−  can correct a
ρw fraction of errors with high probability when the error distribution depends only on C and the
output of a binary symmetric channel BSC(ρr) on the transmitted codeword.
This result is similar to what we want to prove, but the BSC gives less information to the adver-
sary than a comparable erasure channel, and we are allowing the erasure channel to be adversarial.
3 Capacity upper bound
To upper-bound the capacity of the adversarial wiretap channel, we reduce to the case of the
standard, random wiretap channel ([Wyn75]). This channel, which we will refer to as the (ρr, ρw)
random wiretap channel, consists of a BEC(1 − ρr) to the eavesdropper, and a BSC(ρw) to the
receiver. The secrecy capacity of this channel is defined analogously to the previous section, and
has been established in [OU13].
Theorem 3.1 (implicit in [OU13]). When ρr ≤ 1 − h(ρw), the secrecy capacity of the (ρr, ρw)
random wiretap channel under the weak secrecy condition is equal to
1− h(ρw)− ρr −min
p
f(p),
where f(p) = h
(
(2ρw − 1)p+ 1− ρw
)− h(ρw)− ρrh(p).
Remark. Readers familiar with the standard wiretap channel model may recognize the term 1 −
h(ρw)− ρr (the difference of the capacities of the main and eavesdropper channels) as the correct
capacity when the eavesdropper channel is noisier than the main channel in a formal sense. This
condition holds when the channels are flipped; i.e. when the eavesdropper sees the output of a
symmetric channel, and the main channel is a sufficiently good erasure channel, but for our case
they are not comparable under this definition (see discussion in [OU13]). The work of [OU13]
instead uses the notion of “cyclic shift symmetric wiretap channels” to obtain Theorem 3.1. Recall
that minp f(p) < 0 for nonzero ρw and ρr (Figure 1).
The reduction from the adversarial case to the random case is standard: the adversary can
choose to read and write at random, subject only to the bound on the total number of errors. Thus
any code for the adversarial wiretap channel must also be resilient to random errors. To the best of
our knowledge, however, this reduction has not been given explicitly in the literature, so we provide
a proof below.
Theorem 3.2. Let Cn ⊆ {0, 1}n be a code of rate R which achieves decoding error δn and average
equivocation ηn over the (ρr, ρw) adversarial wiretap channel. Then for sufficiently small ξ > 0, Cn
achieves decoding error δn + exp(−Ω(n)) and normalized equivocation ηn(1− exp(−Ω(n)) over the
(ρr − ξ, ρw − ξ) random wiretap channel.
Proof. Reliability. By assumption, Cn achieves decoding error δn over any distribution of errors
with weight ≤ ρwn. In particular, the decoding error of Cn over the BSC(ρw − ξ) is at most
δn + Pr[error has wt > ρw] = δn +
n∑
i=ρwn+1
(
n
i
)
(ρw − ξ)i(1− ρw + ξ)n−i
≤ δn + 2−Ωρw,ξ(n).
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Weak secrecy. We follow the notation of Section 2.1. Let Z ∈ {0, 1, ?}n be the output of the
eavesdropper’s channel BEC(1− ρr + ξ) (with “?” denoting erasure).
Let S be the set of coordinates which are not erased by the eavesdropper’s channel (in earlier
terminology, the support of Z). For fixed S , let V(S ) be the output of the eavesdropper’s channel
conditioned on S being the support of Z. Then the equivocation at the encoder is
∆(Cn) = H(S|Z) =
∑
S⊆[n]
Pr[supp(Z) = S ] ·H(S|V(S )).
Let E denote the event that |S | ≤ ρrn. For ξ > 0, we have Pr[E] ≥ 1 − 2−Ωρr,ξ(n). By our
assumption that Cn achieves secrecy over the AWTC, whenever |S | = ρrn, the equivocation is
H(S|V(S )) ≥ ηnn, where ηn → R. When S has size less than ρrn, we have H(S|V(S )) ≥
H(S|V(S ′)), for arbitrary S ′ ⊇ S of size ρrn (in other words, conditioning does not increase
entropy). In particular, for any S of size ≤ ρrn, H(S|V(S )) ≥ ηnn.
Thus, the normalized equivocation of the decoder is at least
∆
n
≥ Pr[E] · ηn + 1
n
Pr[¬E] ·H(S|¬E,Z)
≥ ηn ·
(
1− exp(−Ωρr,ξ(n))
)
.
As ηn → R as n→∞, we have ∆/n = R− o(1).
Thus, we have shown that C achieves reliability and secrecy over the (ρr − ξ, ρw − ξ) random
wiretap channel, as desired.
Corollary 3.3. The weak secrecy capacity of the (ρr, ρw) adversarial wiretap channel is at most
1− h(ρw)− ρr −minp f(p), where f(p) is defined as in Theorem 3.1.
Proof. Let C be a family of codes achieving a rate R over the (ρr, ρw) AWTC. By Theorem 3.2,
for sufficiently small ξ > 0, C also achieves the rate R over the (ρr − ξ, ρw − ξ) random wiretap
channel. Thus, by Theorem 3.1, R ≤ 1− h(ρw − ξ)− ρr −minp f(p) + ξ.
As ξ can be arbitrarily small, we must have R ≤ 1− h(ρw)− ρr −minp f(p).
4 Capacity lower bound
We will show that the semantic secrecy capacity of the (ρr, ρw) AWTC is at least 1−h(ρw)−ρr by
giving a code construction which achieves this rate. Unsurprisingly, we will show that a random
stochastic code works. (Recall that a stochastic code uses a probabilistic encoding function, allowing
multiple codewords to correspond to the same message.)
For  > 0, let C ⊆ {0, 1}n be a random code of rate R := 1−h(ρw)−  constructed by selecting
2Rn i.i.d. vectors uniformly from {0, 1}n. Abusing notation, we also refer to the encoding map
C : {0, 1}Rn → {0, 1}n which maps a binary string of length Rn to its corresponding codeword.
Define R′ such that R′n = Rn− `, for some ` to be set later. In order to ensure secrecy for our
construction, we define the following partition Π = {Ai}i∈{0,1}R′n of C, which splits C into sets of
size 2`.
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We may then consider C as a stochastic code
CΠ : {0, 1}R′n × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}n
of rate R′ = 1 − h(ρw) − `/n − , which maps the ith message i ∈ {0, 1}R′n and a random index
(seed) r ∈ {0, 1}` to C(m, r), the rth codeword in Ai.
Remark. We will show below that we can choose ` = ρrn−Θ(1) in order to achieve weak secrecy,
so that the final rate of CΠ can be taken to be 1− h(ρw)− ρr − .
For semantic secrecy, we will show that any `/n > ρr suffices, so that the final rate of CΠ can
be taken to be, for example, 1− h(ρw)− ρr − /2.
This rate bound, combined with the results of Corollary 4.5 and Theorem 4.7, which prove
secrecy and reliability for this code, show that the capacity of the (ρr, ρw) AWTC is at least
1− h(ρw)− ρr, as desired.
In the following sections, we will show that CΠ achieves both secrecy and reliability over the
(ρr, ρw) adversarial wiretap channel (precise statements below).
4.1 Secrecy
In this section, we give two proofs that our random code construction achieves secrecy. The first,
based on a simple counting argument, shows that weak secrecy is achieved. The second, based on a
more sophisticated probabilistic argument from [GCP16], shows that semantic secrecy is achieved.
Although the first result is weaker, we believe it is more transparent. Furthermore, although the
asymptotic rates achieved for both are the same, the weak secrecy proof allows for a slightly higher
rate at fixed block lengths than we are able to show in the semantic secrecy case.
4.1.1 Weak secrecy via counting
We show that the random code CΠ achieves weak secrecy with high probability. Following the
approach of [OW84] (which is also used in [ALCP09]), we bound the equivocation of the encoder.
Recall that the rate-R′ code CΠ ⊆ {0, 1}n encodes a message mi by a random vector x ∈ Ai, where
Π = {Ai} is some partition of C.
As before, we denote by S the random variable corresponding to the (uniformly chosen) source
message, and X the random variable corresponding to CΠ’s (randomized) encoding of the message.
For a subset S ⊆ [n] of size ρrn corresponding to the coordinates chosen by the adversary, denote
by V(S ) the view of the adversary on S .
Recall that the equivocation of the encoder is ∆ := minS :|S |=ρrnH(S|V(S )). In the best case,
∆ = R′n, the dimension of the code, and nothing is learned.
We will show that with high probability, the normalized equivocation ∆/n approaches R′ as
n→∞.
In what follows, we write V for V(S ), where S minimizes the equivocation of the encoder.
Lemma 4.1 ([OW84]). The equivocation ∆ of the encoder corresponding to CΠ is
∆ = H(S|X,V) +H(X|V)−H(X|S,V)
= H(X|V)−H(X|S,V)
≥ Rn− ρrn−H(X|S,V).
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Given the above, we are interested in ensuring that H(X|S,V) is small. In other words, given
the message mi, there should be few codewords in the codeword set Ai which are consistent with
any fixed view.
Definition 4.2. Let (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ {0, 1, ?}n be the view of the adversary. A codeword x ∈ C is
consistent with V if xi = vi whenever vi 6=?.
Corollary 4.3. Let L ≥ 1. If for every view V and every message index i, we have
#{x ∈ Ai | x is consistent with V } < L, (1)
then
∆ ≥ Rn− ρrn− logL.
We will show sufficient conditions on L and ` for the condition of Equation (1) to hold, and use
these to show that a normalized equivocation ∆/n going to R′, the rate of the code, is achievable.
More specifically,
Lemma 4.4. Assume R′ > 0. If `/n < ρr−2(R′+1)/L, then with high probability over the choice
of the code C,
#{x ∈ Ai | x is consistent with V } < L
for all V , i.
Proof. Fix V and the index i. The codeword set Ai consists of 2
` i.i.d. vectors chosen uniformly
from {0, 1}n.
Let S|V ⊆ {0, 1}n be the set of strings which is consistent with V . Then S|V has size 2(1−ρr)n.
The number of subsets of SV of size L is(
2n−ρrn
L
)
≤ 2n(1−ρr)L.
The probability that any fixed subset of size L is contained in Ai is at most 2
−(n−`)L.
Thus the probability that
#{x ∈ Ai | x is consistent with V } ≥ L
is at most
2n(1−ρr)L · 2−(n−`)L.
Union bounding over the 2nR
′
choices of i and the 2ρrn · (n`) ≤ 2ρrn2nh(`/n) choices of V , the
probability that the code CΠ fails (i.e. that #{x ∈ Ai | x is consistent with V } ≥ L for some i and
some V ) is
Pr[CΠ fails] ≤ 2n(1−ρr)L−(n−`)L+ρrn+nR′+nh(`/n).
Rearranging, we have
log(Pr[CΠ fails])
n
≤ −ρr(L− 1) + `L
n
+R′ + h(`/n).
If we set
`
n
< ρr − 2(R
′ + 1)
L
,
then the probability that CΠ fails is at most 2
−R′n = 2−Ω(n), as desired.
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Corollary 4.5. With high probability over the choice of the code C, the normalized equivocation
of the encoder approaches R′, the rate of the code CΠ, as the block length n goes to infinity.
Proof. In Lemma 4.4, set L = n, and set ` = ρrn− 2(R′ + 1).
Then by Lemma 4.4, C satisfies the condition of Corollary 4.3 with L = n. Thus, the equivo-
cation of the code is
∆ ≥ Rn− ρrn− log n−O(1)
= R′n+ `− ρrn− log n−O(1)
≥ R′n− 2(R′ + 1)− log n−O(1).
Thus, the normalized equivocation is
∆
n
≥ R′ −O(log n/n),
which approaches R′ as n→∞, as desired.
4.1.2 Semantic secrecy via soft-covering
Semantic secrecy for the Wiretap Channel II with noisy main channel is established in [GCP16].
Although their reliability proof does not apply to our setting with an adversarial main channel,
the adversarial nature of the Wiretap Channel II means that the secrecy analysis applies to the
AWTC. We outline the proof below; for more details, see the original derivation in [GCP16].
At the core of the analysis is the following “stronger soft-covering lemma,” which shows that
the distribution of the output of the channel on a large random subset of codewords is unlikely to
be far from the distribution of the output of the channel on a truly random codeword. In other
words, if each message is associated to ≈ 2(ρr+)n codewords, then the adversary’s view will be
statistically close to uniform for every message, and secrecy is achieved.
In the following, QU is the uniform distribution on {0, 1}; QV |U is a memoryless channel with
output alphabet V, and Sn is a set of 2Rˆn independent elements of {0, 1}n chosen uniformly at
random. For fixed Sn, PV|Sn denotes the distribution on Vn induced by QnV |U on a uniform element
of Sn; that is,
P (v|Sn) = 2−Rˆn
∑
w∈Sn
QnV |U (v|w).
Lemma 4.6 ([GCP16]). For any QV |U , and Rˆ > I(U ;V ), where |V| < ∞, there exist γ1, γ2 > 0
such that for large enough n,
Pr
[
D(PV|Sn‖QnV ) > e−nγ1
] ≤ e−enγ2 ,
where D(·‖·) is the relative entropy.
In what follows, we will apply this lemma to the set of codewords associated to any fixed
message, showing that the adversary’s view is always nearly indistinguishable from uniform.
Recall that our goal is to bound the semantic secrecy metric
Sem(Cn) = max
PS,S
D
[
PV(S )|S,Cn‖PV(S )|Cn |PS
]
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where PS is any distribution over the source message S, and S is a subset of [n] of size ρrn.
First we fix S and PS, in which case ([GCP16])
D
[
PV(S )|S,Cn‖PV(S )|Cn |PS
] ≤ D[PV(S )|S,Cn‖PZ(S )|PS],
where PZ(S ) is the uniform distribution over all strings in {0, 1, ?}n with support equal to S .
Maximizing over PS and recalling that the source message is taken from {0, 1}R′n, we see that
max
PS
D
[
PV(S )|S,Cn‖PZ(S )|PS
] ≤ max
s∈{0,1}R′n
D
[
PV(S )|S=s,Cn‖PZ(S )
]
,
so in particular
max
PS,S
D
[
PV(S )|S,Cn‖PV(S )|Cn |PS
] ≤ max
s∈S,S
D
[
PV(S )|S=s,Cn‖PZ(S )
]
(2)
Let us fix δ > 0, to be set later. We would like to bound the probability that Cn is not
semantically secure, which we do by considering the probability of the following event:
Sem(Cn) = max
PS,S
D
[
PV(S )|S,Cn‖PV(S )|Cn |PS
]
> e−nδ.
By Equation (2),
Pr
[
Sem(Cn) > e
−nδ] ≤ Pr [max
s∈S,S
D
[
PV(S )|S=s,Cn‖PZ(S )
]
> e−nδ
]
. (3)
In order to apply the stronger soft-covering lemma, we fix s and S . Note that V(S ) and Z(S
are supported only on strings with “?” in coordinates not in S . Denoting by PSV(S )|S=s,Cn and
PSZ(S ) the respective distributions restricted to coordinates in S , the relative entropy chain rule
implies that
D
[
PV(S )|S=s,Cn‖PZ(S )
]
= D
[
PSV(S )|S=s,Cn‖PSZ(S )
]
. (4)
(In other words, the “?” coordinates outside of S do not affect the relative entropy on the
left-hand side of Equation (4).)
Recall that PSZ(S ) is just a uniform distribution over strings in {0, 1}|S |. In the statement of
Lemma 4.6, we may set QV |U to be the binary identity channel (so V = {0, 1}).
PSV(S )|S=s,Cn is a distribution on {0, 1}|S | induced by applying QV |U to the 2` uniformly random
codewords which encode s (restricted to the coordinates in S ). Thus, if `/(ρrn) > H(U) = 1, then
by Lemma 4.6, there exist γ1, γ2 > 0 such that for large enough n,
Pr
[
D
[
PSV(S )|S=s,Cn‖PSZ(S )
]
> e−γ1
]
≤ e−enγ2 .
Setting δ = γ1 in Equation (3), we have that
Pr
[
Sem(Cn) > e
−nδ] ≤ Pr [max
s∈S,S
D
[
PV(S )|S=s,Cn‖PZ(S )
]
> e−nδ
]
≤
∑
s,S
Pr
[
D
[
PSV(S )|S=s,Cn‖PSZ(S )
]
> e−γ1
]
(union bound)
≤ 2n · 2n · e−eΩ(n)
= e−Ω(n).
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Thus, Cn achieves semantic secrecy with high probability when `/n > ρr.
4.2 Reliability
In this section, we show that a random code C of rate 1 − h(ρw) −  can correct a ρw fraction of
errors with high probability (over the choice of the code and the uniform choice of the transmitted
codeword) when the error distribution depends only on C and a ρr fraction of the transmitted
codeword. This result is similar in spirit to those of [Lan08] and [DJL15], described in Section 2.2.
More formally, we will show the following.
Theorem 4.7. Fix ρr, ρw > 0. Let C ⊆ {0, 1}n consist of 2Rn i.i.d. uniform vectors, where
R = 1− h(ρw)−  for some  > 0. Then if ρr < 1− h(ρw)− 2, C achieves decoding error o(1) over
the adversarial (ρr, ρw) wiretap channel with high probability.
We follow the proof outline of [DJL15] in order to show that the random code C achieves
reliability over the adversarial (ρr, ρw) wiretap channel. The primary difference is in the definition
of the set C|V , as our adversarial model is different.
In this section, we will not use the association of codewords to messages induced by the par-
titioning Π, and will only consider C as an (ordered) codebook of 2Rn uniform, equally likely
strings.
Once the adversary has read a ρrn fraction of the transmitted codeword, he knows that this
codeword lies in the subset of C which is consistent with the read symbols, but each element of
that subset is equally likely from his perspective. We will show that this is sufficient to ensure that
he cannot cause a decoding error with non-vanishing probability.
The main tool in our analysis is the following lemma, from [DJL15]. At a high level, it states
that a set of random vectors (in our case, codewords) cannot be too concentrated in a small volume
B.
Lemma 4.8. Let A ⊆ {0, 1}n be a set with 2αn elements for some α > 0, ν, β > 0, and B ⊂ A with
|B| ≤ 2n(α−β−ν). Let X1, . . . , XN be chosen uniformly at random from A with N = 2nβ. Then for
constant c > 0,
Pr[#{i | Xi ∈ B} > cn2] ≤ exp
(−Ω(n2)).
This lemma, which follows from a Chernoff bound, implies a standard result on the list-
decodability of random codes.
Corollary 4.9. Let C ⊆ {0, 1}n be a random code of rate 1−h(ρw)− for  > 0. With probability
1 − exp(−Ω(n2)) over the choice of C, every Hamming ball in {0, 1}n of radius ρwn contains at
most O(n2) elements of C.
Proof. In Lemma 4.8, let B ⊆ {0, 1}n be a Hamming ball of radius ρwn, which has size at most
2nh(ρw). A union bound over all 2n such Hamming balls proves the statement.
As before, let us denote the adversary’s view by (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ {0, 1, ?}n.
Denote by C|V the set of codewords which are consistent with V (i.e., the codewords which
have vi in the ith coordinate, whenever vi 6=?). Let E0 be the event that C|V has size between
2(1−h(ρw)−ρr−3/2)n and 2(1−h(ρw)−ρr−/2)n for all views V . Using a Chernoff bound and union-
bounding over all V , we see that
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Pr
C
[E0] ≥ 1− exp(−2Ω(n)).
Conditioned on E0, C|V has size at least 2n/4, by our assumption on ρr. We partition C|V into
sets Si of size 2
n/4, with the exception of the last set, which may have size less than 2n/4. This is
done using the ordering on C: the first set S1 consists of the first 2
n/4 elements of C|V , and each
subsequent block contains the next ≤ 2n/4 elements of C|V .
Let E1 be the event that the transmitted codeword does not lie in the last set of the partition.
Over the uniform choice of the transmitted codeword, we have that
Pr[E1|E0] ≥ 1− 2n/4/|C|V | ≥ 1− exp
(−Ω(n)).
Following the approach of [DJL15], we will show that (conditioned on E0 and E1) for any fixed
error vector e of weight ρwn, for every i, the probability over x ∈ Si that x+ e causes a decoding
error is small. In other words, even if the adversary is only oblivious over the much smaller set
Si ⊆ C|V , he still cannot reliably cause a decoding error. (We can think of the set Si which contains
the true transmitted codeword as being side or oracle information given to the decoder.)
In the analysis which follows, we may think of the set Sr as one of the sets Si which have size
2n/4. We will show that any such set Sr causes few decoding errors.
Definition 4.10. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n, and let e ∈ {0, 1}n be fixed of weight at most ρwn. Denote by
Bρw(x+ e) the Hamming ball of radius ρwn around x+ e.
If x′ ∈ Bρw(x+ e), we say that x+ e conflicts with x′.
In other words, if x + e conflicts with x′, then both x and x′ are valid outputs of the decoder,
and we will consider this to be a decoding error. In what follows, we will show that for any fixed
error vector e, there are “few” conflicts in a random code.
Lemma 4.11. Let Sr ⊆ C|V be of size 2n/4, and let e ∈ {0, 1}n have weight at most ρwn. Let Ne
denote the number of codewords x ∈ Sr such that x + e conflicts with some codeword not in Sr.
Then, conditioned on E0, Ne ≤ O(n4) with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)) over the choice of C.
Proof. We first show that Sr has few conflicts with the codewords outside of C|V . Let A ⊆ {0, 1}n
be the set of all strings with are not consistent with V . In Lemma 4.8, set B =
⋃
x∈Sr Bρw(x+ e),
and let X1, . . . , XN be the codewords of C \C|V . By construction of C, the Xi are chosen uniformly
from the space A, and we have N ≤ 2nR.
We have |A| = 2n − 2(1−ρr)n, and |B| ≤ 2h(ρw)n+n/4 ≤ 2(1−R−/2)n. Thus, by Lemma 4.8, with
probability 1− 2−Ω(n2), there are at most O(n2) codewords x′ ∈ C \C|V such that x′ is at distance
≤ ρwn from x+ e, for some x ∈ Sr.
By Corollary 4.9, with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)), for each such x′, the number of codewords
in C in the Hamming ball of radius ρwn around x
′ − e is at most O(n2).
Now we show that Sr has few conflicts with the codewords in C|V \ Sr. Because we are
conditioning on E0, we have that |C|V | ≤ 2(1−h(ρw)−ρr−/2)n. Set B as before, and let Ac ⊆ {0, 1}n
be the set of strings which are consistent with V (the complement of the set A above). We have
|Ac| = 2(1−ρr)n.
As the elements of C|V \ Sr are uniformly distributed in the set Ac, we may apply Lemma 4.8
once more. As |B∩Ac| ≤ 2h(ρw)n+n/4 ≤ 2(1−ρr)n−(1−h(ρw)−ρr−/2)n−n/4, by Lemma 4.8 we conclude
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that with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)), there are at most O(n2) codewords x′ ∈ C|V \Sr such that
x′ is at distance ρwn from x+ e, for some x ∈ Sr.
Again by Corollary 4.9, with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n2)), for each such x′, the number of
codewords in C in the Hamming ball of radius ρwn around x
′ − e is at most O(n2).
This shows that there are at most O(n2) codewords x′ ∈ C \Sr such that x′ ∈
⋃
x∈Sr Bρw(x+e),
and each such x′ is in at most O(n2) balls Bρw(x+ e). Thus conditioned on E0, Ne ≤ O(n4) with
probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)), as desired.
It remains to show that when the transmitted codeword is chosen uniformly from Sr, the
adversary is unlikely to cause confusion with another codeword in Sr. This can be shown directly
using the techniques of [DJL15], or by appealing to the results of [Lan08]. Let us outline the
argument of [DJL15].
Lemma 4.12. Assume that E0 holds. Let T ⊆ {0, 1}n have size 2n/8, and fix e ∈ {0, 1}n of weight
at most ρwn. Let Sr ⊆ C|V have size 2n/4.
Then with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n2)) over the choice of Sr, the number Me of x ∈ T such
that x+ e conflicts with some codeword in Sr is at most O(n
4).
Proof. Note that the elements of Sr are chosen uniformly at random from a space of size 2
(1−ρr)n,
and the size of Sr is 2
n/4.
Similarly to the previous lemma, we apply Lemma 4.8 with B =
⋃
x∈T Bρwn(x + e). We have
|B| ≤ 2h(ρw)n+n/8 < 2(1−ρr)n−n/4 (recall that ρr < 1−h(ρw)−2). Then by Lemma 4.8, the number
of x′ ∈ Sr which intersect Bρwn(x+ e) for some x ∈ T is O(n2) with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)).
As before, we then also have that each x′ only intersects Bρwn(x+ e) for O(n2) different x ∈ T ,
with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)). Thus Me ≤ O(n4), as desired.
Lemma 4.13. Fix e ∈ {0, 1}n of weight at most ρwn, and let Sr ⊆ C|V have size 2n/4. Then with
probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n2)) over the choice of codewords in Sr, there are at most O(n4) · 2n/8
codewords x ∈ Sr such that x+ e contains another codeword in Sr.
Proof. The proof of this fact appears in the full version of [DJL15], but we record it here for
completeness.
We consider arranging the elements of Sr arbitrarily into a 2
n/8× 2n/8-sized array A, indexed
by i, j ∈ [2n/8].
For fixed i, let r(i) = {A(i, j)|j ∈ [2n/8]} be the ith row of A. Similarly for fixed j, we can
define the jth column of A to be c(j) = {A(i, j)|i ∈ [2n/8]}.
Define the event E2 to be the event that each row r(i) has O(n
4) elements x such that x + e
conflicts with some x′ ∈ r(i′), for i′ 6= i, and each column c(j) similarly has O(n4) elements x such
that x + e conflicts with some element in c(j′), j′ 6= j. We claim that E2 holds with probability
1− exp(−Ω(n2)) over the uniform choice of codewords in C|V .
Let us fix a row r(i) (the argument for columns is identical). Note that the elements of r(i) are
independent of the rest of the array. Thus, by Lemma 4.12, with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)), for
any i, there are O(n4) elements x ∈ r(i) such that x+ e conflicts with some x′ ∈ r(i′), for i′ 6= i.
As there are 2 · 2n/8 total rows and columns, we apply a union bound to conclude E2 holds
with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)) · exp(O(n)) = 1− exp(−Ω(n2)).
Whenever E2 holds, by considering all 2
n/8 rows, we have that the number of array elements
A(i, j) in A such that A(i, j) + e conflicts with another codeword A(i′, j′) for i′ 6= i is at most
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O(n4) · 2n/8. Similarly, the number of array elements A(i, j) such that A(i, j) + e conflicts with
A(i′, j′) for j′ 6= j is at most O(n4) · 2n/8.
Thus, the number of codewords A(i, j) such that A(i, j) + e conflicts with a different codeword
A(i′, j′) is at most O(n4) · 2n/8 with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)).
For a fixed set Sr ⊆ C|V of size 2n/4 and a fixed error vector e ∈ {0, 1}n of weight ρwn, let
E2(Sr, e) be the event that the number of codewords in Sr which result in a decoding error for a
fixed error vector e is at most
23n/16 +O(n4)
Combining Lemmas 4.11 and 4.13, we see that Pr[E2(Sr, e)|E0] ≥ 1− exp(−Ω(n2)).
Recall that {Si} was a partition of C|V into sets of size 2n/4, with the possible exception of
the last set. Conditioned on the event E1, the set Si which contains the transmitted codeword has
size 2n/4. In particular, we can apply a union bound over the exponentially many partition sets
Si of size 2
n/4, at most 2n error vectors e, and adversary views V to conclude that E2(Si, e) holds
for all such Si, e with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)) over the choice of the code C.
Thus, conditioned on E0, the decoding error of C is at most
Pr[¬E1] + Pr[error|E1] ≤ Pr[¬E1] + O(n
4) · 2n/8 +O(n4)
2n/4
= exp
(−Ω(n))
with probability 1− exp(−Ω(n2)).
As E0 holds with probability 1− exp(−2Ω(n)), C achieves decoding error o(1) with high proba-
bility over the choice of C.
Combined with the results of Section 4.1, we have shown the following:
Theorem 4.14. Let C ⊆ {0, 1}n be a random code of rate R = 1 − h(ρw) − , and let Π = {Ai}
be a random partition of C into subsets of size ` = ρrn−O(1).
Then, with high probability over the choices of C and Π, the stochastic code CΠ which maps
the ith message mi ∈ {0, 1}Rn−` to a random element of Ai has rate
R(CΠ) ≥ 1− h(ρr)− ρr − 
and achieves reliability and secrecy over the (ρr, ρw) adversarial wiretap channel.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the secrecy capacity of the (ρr, ρw) adversarial wiretap channel is at least
1 − h(ρw) − ρr. Below we outline what we believe to be the most interesting directions for future
research.
Exact capacity. The most natural open question remaining is to close the gap between Corol-
lary 3.3 and Theorem 4.14. It seems plausible that the lower bound can be improved to match the
upper bound, as in the case of the Wiretap Channel II with noisy (rather than adversarial) main
channel. Doing so would require a refinement of the reliability analysis to handle different input
distributions.
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Explicit constructions. The question of efficiently constructing binary codes for wiretap channels
is a challenging one, and here we would be interested in any improvement over the fully random
construction, including constructions which use fewer random bits. There have been constructions
given for certain special cases, including when ρr = 0 ([GS10]) and when ρw = 0 ([CDS12]), but to
the best of our knowledge, nothing is known for the general case.
Note that over large alphabets, both of these questions were addressed by the construction
of [WSN16], which pairs folded Reed-Solomon codes, which are optimally list-decodable, with
explicit “algebraic manipulation detection” codes. The latter ingredient is still valid over a binary
alphabet, but we do not know explicit binary codes which can be list-decoded with optimal rate.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Vincent Tan for many helpful discussions throughout the course of this work, and for
constructive suggestions which greatly improved the presentation of this work. Thanks as well to
Sidharth Jaggi for sharing a draft of his work on myopic adversaries. Thanks to Omur Ozel for
pointing out an error in the statement of Theorem 3.1 in the first version of this paper.
References
[ALCP09] V. Aggarwal, Lifeng Lai, A.R. Calderbank, and H.V. Poor. Wiretap channel type II with an active
eavesdropper. In ISIT 2009. IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 2009., pages
1944–1948, June 2009.
[BTV12] Mihir Bellare, Stefano Tessaro, and Alexander Vardy. Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2012:
32nd Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19-23, 2012. Proceedings,
chapter Semantic Security for the Wiretap Channel, pages 294–311. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012.
[CDS12] M. Cheraghchi, F. Didier, and A. Shokrollahi. Invertible extractors and wiretap protocols. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 58(2):1254–1274, Feb 2012.
[CK78] I. Csiszar and J. Korner. Broadcast channels with confidential messages. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 24(3):339–348, May 1978.
[DJL15] B.K. Dey, S. Jaggi, and M. Langberg. Sufficiently myopic adversaries are blind. In 2015 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pages 1164–1168, June 2015.
[GCP16] Z. Goldfeld, P. Cuff, and H. Permuter. Semantic-security capacity for wiretap channels of type
II. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, PP(99):1–1, 2016.
[GS10] V. Guruswami and A. Smith. Codes for computationally simple channels: Explicit construc-
tions with optimal rate. In 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
(FOCS), pages 723–732, Oct 2010.
[Lan08] M. Langberg. Oblivious communication channels and their capacity. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 54(1):424–429, Jan 2008.
[NY15] M. Nafea and A. Yener. Wiretap channel II with a noisy main channel. In 2015 IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pages 1159–1163, June 2015.
[OU13] O. Ozel and S. Ulukus. Wiretap channels: Implications of the more capable condition and cyclic
shift symmetry. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 59(4):2153–2164, April 2013.
18
[OW84] L.H. Ozarow and A.D. Wyner. Wire-tap channel II. AT & T Bell Laboratories Technical Journal,
63(10):2135–2157, Dec 1984.
[Sha48] C. E. Shannon. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal,
27(3):379–423, 1948.
[WSN16] Pengwei Wang and R. Safavi-Naini. A model for adversarial wiretap channels. IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, 62(2):970–983, Feb 2016.
[Wyn75] A. D. Wyner. The wire-tap channel. The Bell System Technical Journal, 54(8):1355–1387, Oct
1975.
19
